FDI flows to the MENA region have been relatively low when compared to neighboring countries. This paper aims at investigating whether there are significant region-specific factors for FDI performance in MENA and EU regions. We employ a panel data approach and use the inward FDI performance index as dependent variable, including both institutional and macroeconomic variables as FDI determinants. The results reveal similar impact of the economic factors but significant differences between the two regions with regard to institutional determinants particularly investment climate, government size and trade barriers. This leads to the conclusion that more appropriate policies are needed in the MENA region in order to develop a friendly economic and institutional environment to attract foreign investors.
Introduction
In the last decade, the impact of national institutions quality in economic development has been receiving growing attention in the literature. In fact, institutional aspects as the protection of intellectual property rights, the regulation system, the degree of economic freedom and the level of corruption seem to be linked to countries' economic prosperity. However, there has been some controversy about the direction of the causality between these aspects: do good institutions favour development or, on the contrary, do high development levels contribute to the emergence of good institutions? Although this question has not been definitively solved, Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2002) give robust evidence that it is the quality of the institutions that stimulates economic development.
On the other hand, developing countries have been increasing their share in the total of world FDI flows, raising a growing interest in the study of FDI determinants in these countries. It has been recognized that FDI flows supply additional resources to the developing countries that can improve their economic performance, through technological progress, improvement in the factors productivity and incentives to national investment.
Several studies have analysed the importance of institutional quality in FDI performance in developing countries, based on the understanding that good institutions should have a positive influence in the promotion of investment and of FDI flows in particular. Due to the fact that currently FDI represents a large share of capital formation in poor countries (UNCTAD, 2011) , the FDI-promoting effect of good institutions might be an important channel of their overall effect on economic growth and development.
Two facts justify this relationship between institutions and FDI attraction. Firstly, the presence of good institutions reduces investment transaction costs, turning it more profitable. Secondly, as FDI flows involve large sunk costs, investments become very sensitive to instability and insecurity, which are closely related to the effectiveness of the legal system and to the framework to enforce property rights. Some studies have analysed the influence of economic freedom on FDI performance in developing countries, especially with regards to issues of country's trade policy, its banking and finance services and its property rights protection (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003) . Likewise, Gwartney et al. (2003) suggested that the key components to economic freedom include freedom to invest and compete, voluntary exchange, and protection of the individual and property rights.
The new wave of globalisation has been changing the way in which firms pursue their investment strategies, and altered the motives for investing abroad. Dunning (2002) claims that FDI in developing countries has shifted from market and resource-seeking investments, to more efficiency-seeking investments. Other authors argue that the relative importance of the traditional market related aspects (infrastructure, macroeconomic policy and wages) no longer holds, suggesting that other factors are becoming more relevant, like the quality of institutions and economic freedom (Becchetti and Hasan, 2004) .
In what concerns the MENA region, previous literature has emphasised that FDI flows have been relatively scarce, compared to the European Union (EU) and to other developing and emerging countries (see for example Chan and Gemayel, 2004 or Méon and . Some features of the MENA countries could entail an important constraint for the inward FDI performance as well as to economic growth. In fact, this region´s economy is greatly anchored on oil which weakens the economic base, displays an underdeveloped physical infrastructure, weak regional integration and underdeveloped capital and financial markets. In consequence, the region presents low rates of return on human and physical capital. Furthermore, high rates of population growth and unemployment are also worrying. Finally, the weakness of institutions in the MENA countries is widely acknowledged. In fact, despite the vast privatization program in the last years, the weight of the state in the economy is still important, and the literature stresses the lack of transparency and democracy. Accordingly, several authors have stated the importance of institutions for economic development in the MENA countries (see for example Sayan,2009 or Brach, 2009 ).
Yet, the analysis of MENA institutional systems appears to be particularly attractive since a significant number of these countries have been experiencing intense economic and institutional reforms.
In this process, the EuroMediterranean Partnership (EMP) agreement between 27 EU members and 12 Mediterranean partner countries has played an important role. This agreement aims at strengthening co-operation between these two regions and is centred on economic and trade integration as a starting point for socioeconomic development in the MENA region. Therefore, the EMP has promoted a progressive elimination of trade barriers and boosted trade relations. Some MENA countries have liberalized investment regulatory framework, creating special regimes for FDI. Reforms include tax and custom duty breaks, lowering ownership limitations and implementing privatization and capital markets reform programs ( Brach, 2007 and Magnan-Marionnet et al., 2008) . Taking into account these facts and the relatively sparse empirical research on FDI in MENA countries, we think that it is important to study this subject.
In this paper we analyse the determinants of FDI performance in the MENA region, trying to capture the differences in relation to the EU members, by using a sample of 42 countries, which include 17 MENA countries (a larger number than most of previous studies) and 25 of the present EU members 1 . The aim is to investigate whether there are region-specific factors that are significant for FDI performance. Empirical studies on the determinants of FDI differ in terms of the variables, methodologies and the characteristics of FDI. The main determinants affecting the FDI flows can be classified into two categories, market-oriented factors and institutional-oriented factors. The effect of these variables on FDI changes over time, according to economic and institutional conditions. In this study, our emphasis is on institutional-oriented variables, although we also include economic variables.
We use a panel model covering a period of 10 years and consider, as indicators of the institutional efficiency, variables included in the Index of Economic Freedom provided by Heritage Foundation. The use of these variables has not been common in previous research analysis on FDI in the MENA region. To our knowledge, only a few papers have used the overall Index of Economic Freedom to assess the impact of institutions on economic development of MENA countries in general (Brach, 2009 ) and on FDI in particular (Kobeissi,2005 and Caetano and Caleiro,2009) . In this work, we analyse the importance of several variables included in the Index of Economic Freedom separately. This paper also differs from most previous studies in other aspects. Firstly, it adds to the previous literature as it compares MENA countries with a neighbouring region (EU) and specifically tests for significant differences in the effects of institutional variables. In doing so, it also helps in the investigation of the influence of institutions for FDI in the EU region. Secondly, contrary to most studies, we use as dependent variable the inward FDI performance index, as provided by UNCTAD. The index measures FDI performance for a 3 year period which is a better variable to measure FDI attractiveness, given the usual high volatility of FDI flows.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical literature linking institutions and FDI, emphasising research on the MENA countries. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical study and examines some descriptive statistics on the economic and institutional variables. Section 4 presents the econometric approach and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
Literature overview
The literature on institutions and FDI is mainly related to the study of the impact of institutions quality on inward FDI flows. An early attempt to study this issue is due to Wheeler and Mody (1992) , which use the first principal component of 13 risk factors, including bureaucracy, political instability, corruption and the legal system quality. However, they did not find a significant impact of 'good' institutions on the location of US foreign affiliates. A later study performed by Wei (2000) pointed out corruption as a significant barrier to FDI flows. Nevertheless, this result was challenged by Stein and Daude (2001) who argued that high correlation between corruption and GDP per capita could lead to spurious results as GDP per capita was not included in the equation. Using a wider range of institution variables, they showed inward FDI to be significantly influenced by the quality of institutions. Likewise, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) found governance infrastructure as a key determinant of both FDI inflows and outflows. Moreover, they claim that FDI is more strongly affected by improvements in governance in developing countries than in developed countries. Busse and Carsten (2005) investigate the relation between FDI flows and political risk and institutions in developing countries, considering 12 different indicators for the period 1984 to 2003. They identify investment profile, internal and external conflicts, ethnic tensions and accountability as important determinants of FDI. Moreover, the results reveal that among all these political indicators, government stability and law are greatly relevant for investment decisions.
More recently, the relationship between FDI flows and institutions in some emerging markets was studied by Dumludag et al. (2007) , by employing a panel data approach from 1992 to 2004. They conclude that institutional variables are significant, particularly corruption, investment profile and government stability.
The impact of 'institutional distance' between the home country and the host country was studied by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) . They estimate a gravity equation for bilateral FDI stocks including governance indicators for both countries. The analysis provides robust evidence that institutions do matter, independently of the countries development level. In fact, the results confirm that inward FDI is positively influenced by public efficiency, which includes tax system, lack of corruption, property rights and the facility to create a business.
A recent study of Ali et al. (2010) investigates the role of institutions, with a panel of 61 developing countries, concluding that institutions are a robust predictor of FDI and that the most significant institutional aspects are linked to property rights.
Summing up, many empirical analyses support the idea that institutional quality is an important determinant of FDI. Most studies claim that the presence of clear and enforceable laws to ensure property rights, low corruption levels and economic and political stability influence FDI flows. However, specific studies about the impact of institutions on FDI for both the EU and the MENA regions are not common.
In what concerns the EU region, research on FDI determinants has substantially increased following the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) entry into the EU, but many of the studies do not concentrate on the institutional determinants. One of the first studies that considered institutional aspects in the CEEC was Resmini (2000), who used a synthetic indicator of risk and identified a positive relationship between risk and investment flows. Carstensen and Toubal (2004) , also conclude that transition specific factors, such as the level and method of privatization and the country risk, are important to explain differences in attractiveness of the individual countries to foreign investors. On the contrary, Bevan and Estrin (2004) studied the determinants of FDI inflows in transition economies, including country risk and have shown that it is not a significant factor. find evidence that institutional development in general increases FDI inflows in transition economies, identifying private sector growth, development of the banking sector, foreign exchange and trade liberalization, and legal development as those specific institutions with positive effect on FDI.
Including countries which had recently joined the EU and those which were to become EU members, Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) intended to verify if institutional factors, such as civil rights and internationalization of the national economy, were critical in explaining the behaviour of FDI inflows. They concluded that civil rights are important for a country to become an attractive location for investment. Ferragina and Pastore (2006) study FDI flows from the EU to two neighbouring regions: Central and Eastern Europe and South Mediterranean countries (including MENA countries), aiming at investigating whether there was any diversion effect on FDI flows following the CEE integration in the EU. Among the explanatory variables they include some institutional aspects like the existence of current and capital account restrictions and governance indicators. They conclude that there is no evidence of FDI diversion, but the results highlight that governance is highly significant. Kostevc et al. (2007) employ the Heritage Foundation Index and find a significant relation between FDI inflows and the overall Index of Economic Freedom, concluding that the quality of the institutional environment in transition economies is important.
Referring to the MENA region, several works have investigated the importance of institutions for FDI inflows. One of the first studies about FDI performance in the MENA region was carried out by Kamaly (2002) . By employing a dynamic panel model covering 1990-1999, the author concludes that economic growth and the lagged value of FDI/GDP are the only significant determinants of FDI flows to the MENA countries. He also includes a democracy index as a possible explanatory variable but, although displaying the expected sign, this variable turns out to have an insignificant effect on FDI inflows.
Onyeiwu (2003), examines some institutional aspects that may affect FDI flows, comparing 10 MENA countries with other developing countries and employing a panel data model for the period 1975 to 1999. The results show only two significant factors explaining FDI inflows to the MENA countries: corruption and trade openness.
Using a dynamic panel data models for 19 MENA countries and 14 EU members, for the period 1990-1999, Chan and Gemayel (2004) conclude that the degree of economic instability has a much stronger impact on FDI than risk itself, especially in the case of the MENA region.
Another study on the influence of quality of institutions on trade and FDI in MENA countries, for the same period, was done by Méon and Sekkat (2004) . They used some indicators to proxy the quality of institutions and found a significant link between political risk and inward FDI, but did not show clear evidence of a significant relationship between corruption and FDI flows. Likewise, Sekkat and Véganzonés-Varoudakis (2004) asserted that political instability is important to explain MENA countries poor FDI performance.
Onyeiwu (2008) also considers political risk, by using both a logit model and cross-country regressions for 61 countries, including some MENA countries. Results show that, besides GDP per capita and trade openness, political risk is significant in FDI attraction. The author concludes that, despite the MENA region poor science and technology infrastructure, the region can still attract FDI by promoting openness as well as political rights and civil liberties.
In the same line, Habash (2006) , uses a comprehensive sample of 19 MENA countries for the period 1980-2003, and shows that increased political rights and increased human capital levels positively affect FDI inflows in the MENA region.
Two more recent studies by Mina (2009 Mina ( , 2010 Kobeissi (2005) , uses an average combination of some indicators of economic freedom provided by the Heritage Foundation. He concludes that all these factors are important in explaining FDI inflows, although governance is the most significant factor.
Finally, Caetano and Caleiro (2009) also consider the relation between economic freedom and FDI performance in the MENA countries and in the EU. By using fuzzy logic clustering and the Index of Economic Freedom, they conclude that the overall index of economic freedom and inward FDI are positively related.
In sum, the vast majority of the studies conclude that institutions are essential in explaining the MENA region poor performance in attracting FDI. Yet, they have displayed some conflicting results, as the same determinants are found to be significant in some studies, but not in others. This seems to be mainly due to the use of different data sets and methodologies as well as to the different number of countries included. Hence, it is important to further study the effect of institutions on FDI flows to the MENA region.
Variables and Data Sources
In this section we perform a brief sketch of the variables used in the study and analyse the descriptive statistics of the data. Detailed information on the variables and sources of the data are in the appendix. We use a panel data set comprising 42 countries, which include 17 MENA countries and 25 EU members, for the period 1995/97-2004/06. The period of analysis was limited by the availability of the data, in particular in relation to the Index of Economic Freedom which is only available after 1995. Also, our sample includes several EU members from Central and Eastern Europe, for which there is not much reliable data before mid 1990s.
Referring to FDI data, we employ the Inward FDI performance index as provided by UNCTAD, which ranks countries by the FDI inflows relative to their economic size. The index assumes that, other things being equal, economic size is the 'base line' for attracting investment, and therefore differences in the index performance are consequence of factors other than market size. This work aims at analysing the impact of several institutional variables on FDI performance besides the effect of economic variables, like GDP per capita, trade openness and population of the host country. As indicators of the institutional efficiency, we consider some of the variables included in the Index of Economic Freedom. The index provides 10 different categories of economic freedom. Among these, we select the six that theoretically affect more FDI flows:
-Business Freedom is the ability to create, operate, and close firms quickly and easily. Naturally, when business freedom is higher there should be more incentive to invest and consequently we expect a positive relationship with inward FDI performance.
-Trade Freedom is related to the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Its impact on FDI depends on the specific nature of the investment (Kojima, 1975) . If the aim is to supply domestic markets and overcome trade barriers then a greater trade freedom will tend to reduce FDI. On the other hand, if the viability of the investments is highly dependent on imported inputs, FDI will be boosted by more trade freedom. Empirical studies have provided evidence supporting both premises, so the expected result is ambiguous.
-Government size is measured by countries government expenditure. Lower levels of expenditure represent a higher index value. When government expenditures become too high, public sector competes with private agents in investing, therefore generating crowding-out effects and interfering in the market prices. Consequently, high government expenditures might discourage foreign investments.
-Investment Freedom is an assessment of the free flow of capital in the country. The correlation between the investment freedom and FDI is intuitive. In fact, in the absence of barriers, capital will flow to countries where productivity and the rate of return on investment will be higher. Firms tend to invest in economies that have less restrictive regulations on capital flows. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the FDI performance index and this indicator.
-Property rights are also expected to be positively correlated with inward FDI performance. In reality, legislation that provides a high level of security in terms of private property implies a smaller risk for foreign firms when investing.
-Freedom from corruption has been suggested to affect positively FDI. Corruption might disturb the optimal allocation of resources in any economy, because it introduces uncertainty and additional costs to the agents' decisions. Thus, it is accepted that the foreign firms' perception of corruption influences negatively their investment decisions.
Some descriptive statistics of the variables used in this work are presented in Table 1 . Analysing GDP per capita we conclude that the EU displays an average of about 42.5% higher than the MENA countries. On the other hand, the EU also presents an openness degree which is higher than the MENA's, but a lower average in the countries' population. In what concerns the institutional variables, data reveals that the values of Business freedom are very similar for the EU and the MENA. In the case of Government size index, the MENA region presents a much higher value than the EU (the average index is about 41% higher than in the EU).
As for the other indicators, the EU displays a more favourable situation, namely in terms of Trade freedom, Investment freedom, Freedom from corruption and Property rights. This situation for the MENA countries may indicate the existence of more obstacles to FDI than in the EU.
Finally, we notice the existence of high dispersion in the variables (measured by the standard deviation) for both regions. This reveals the existence of high heterogeneity of the economic performance and of the quality of institutions inside each group. In the case of the MENA countries very different realities coexist. In fact, some countries developed special efforts to become investor-friendly by making their business environments more open and by stepping up structural and institutional reforms, while others have been pursuing different strategies. As for the EU, the dispersion of the variables is related to the fact that during this period several new countries, displaying very different levels of economic and social development, have joined the EU 3 .
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We have considered the current composition of the EU, without taking into account the fact that along this period many countries have joined the EU. In effect, at the beginning of the period the Union had only 15 members and currently it comprises 27. Naturally, in some economic and institutional variables the proximity in the average and standard errors between the two groups (MENA and EU) reflects the fact that the countries that joined the EU more recently display lower values than the oldest members.
Empirical Approach and Analysis of Results
We estimate a gravity-type model in order to identify the differences in the determinants of FDI between MENA countries and EU countries, in the period 1995 to 2006. Following most of the previous studies, we use panel data techniques to estimate the model. In fact, it is important to consider possible unobservable country effects which may be correlated with FDI performance and that are not taken into account in a cross-sectional approach. Therefore, our model is:
where Y jt represents the logarithm of the index of FDI inward performance and X it-2 stands for the explanatory variables that are specific to each country. Given the fact that there is a lag in the investment decision, we consider a two year lag in the explanatory variables. In fact, the FDI performance index is measured for a three year period, so we use the value of the explanatory variables for the first year of this period.
We use as explanatory variables the traditional gravity variables: the logarithm of GDP per capita (GDPcap) and the logarithm of the country population (population). It is expected that both GDP per capita and population will have a positive impact on FDI performance. We also include the degree of openness of the host country (open), proxied by the logarithm of the ratio of external trade as a whole to GDP, which should be also positively correlated with FDI. Several variables representing institutional issues are considered. Specifically, we include the six indicators of economic freedom, which might be related to FDI: Trade, Investment, Corruption, Government Size, Property Rights and Business.
Contrasting with previous studies, in order to test if there are significant differences in the effects of institutions between the two regions, we also introduce several interactions between the dummy variable MENA and each of the institutional variables (MENA equals one if the country belongs to the MENA region). We expect at least some of the institutional variables to affect significantly FDI performance. Moreover, it is expected that the effect of the institutional variables will differ significantly between the two regions. Finally, a dummy variable to capture possible differences for the countries that joined the EU along the time period was also included (JEU).
The error structure of the model comprises a i , which represents the unobservable fixed effect (which model time-invariant country specific effects) and it  which is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. The unobservable time effect is represented by , to take into account possible business cycle effects.
Following a panel approach we have to consider the choice between a random-effects and a fixed-effects model. If the country specific fixed effects (a i ) are correlated to the explanatory variables, a fixed-effects model should be adopted. The Hausman test can be used to check this correlation. In the present case the Hausman test 4 rejected the hypothesis of no correlation between the common specific effects and the regressors, suggesting the use of a fixed-effects model. In addition, we calculate cluster robust standard errors in order to correct for heteroskedasticity problems and within-group serial correlation.
One problem that may arise in this type of empirical analysis of FDI determinants is the possible endogeneity of the institutional variables as well as from GDP and trade openness, which can bias estimated coefficients and cause invalid statistical inference. In fact, some studies have indicated that economic outcomes may have an impact on institutions and therefore it is possible that FDI will affect the quality of institutions. Furthermore, other studies have argued that FDI has a positive impact on economic growth and trade openness.
On the other hand, there is also the possibility that past values of FDI will affect present ones, due to the existence of agglomeration economies. Previous studies have demonstrated this effect to be highly significant (see for example Chan and Gemayel, 2004 or Mina, 2010) and, therefore, a lagged dependent variable should be included as an explanatory variable. In this latter case we have a dynamic panel data model.
As we are using in our study all the explanatory variables lagged by two periods, the possibility of endogeneity is significantly diminished. Nevertheless, to check for the robustness of results, we have performed a sensitivity analysis considering also a dynamic panel data model and the explanatory variables as potentially endogenous:
Due to the fact that the lagged Y and the a i are correlated and in order to obtain consistent estimates, the model was estimated by generalised method of moments (GMM), suggested by Arellano and Bond(1991) . This method also allows us to correct for the endogeneity of other explanatory variables included in the model. The consistency of the Arellano-Bond estimator requires the inexistence of second-order serial correlation of the first-differenced residuals. Hence, the test for serial correlation was performed as well as a test for over- 4 We have used the F version of the Hausman test as well as the robust Hausman test suggested by Wooldridge (2002) . In table 2 we present both the fixed effects and the GMM estimates. Although there are differences in the coefficient estimates between the two methods, to the exception of trade freedom, the results are quite similar for the significant variables and, in general, the conclusions are the same. Furthermore, the dynamic panel model results confirm that foreign investment in the previous period is highly relevant for FDI in the current period.
As expected, GDP per capita, population and degree of openness seem to be important in explaining FDI performance. This indicates that a higher purchasing power of potential consumers (proxied by the GDP per capita), country size (proxied by population) and a higher degree of trade openness are strong stimuli for FDI flows in these countries. Moreover, these variables seem to affect both regions in a similar way 5 .
Concerning the institutional variables, in the case of EU countries, the results reveal that only a few indicators are significant. In both models Investment freedom is important to explain FDI performance. Also, in the static model, Trade freedom seems to be correlated with FDI. However, these variables display a negative effect on FDI performance which is not according to what is expected. The reason why FDI performance in the EU countries seems to be negatively correlated with these variables may be greatly related with the performance of some new EU members in this period. Indeed, some new member states present lower levels in these indicators and have been displaying a good FDI performance. We have to bear in mind that ten of the current EU members have made a transition from centrally planned to market economies, initiating the adaptation of their institutions in the 1990's. Hence, it is normal that the indicators of economic freedom of these countries are smaller than the ones of the older members 6 . In the case of Trade freedom a negative correlation might mean that trade and FDI are substitutes, and therefore a higher trade liberalisation implies a reduction in FDI flows. The phenomenon of substitutability of trade and FDI is commonly termed as tariff-jumping (Bloningen, 2002) where firms' main drive for FDI is to establish production facilities behind tariff walls. When trade is liberalized, the incentives for FDI are reduced.
Regarding the MENA countries, previous work using the Index of Economic Freedom has concluded that economic freedom is important for both economic development and FDI inflows. Accordingly, our findings show economic freedom to be important for FDI performance. Yet, in this work, we also conclude that only some institutional factors are significant.
The results uncover significant differences between the MENA region and the EU, especially in what concerns the effect of Government size and Investment Freedom. In effect, we tested the significance of the variables to explain FDI performance in the MENA region, and concluded that both Investment Freedom and Government size have a significant influence in these countries 7 . Contrary to the EU, higher Investment Freedom positively and significantly affects FDI performance in the MENA countries. This implies the need to implement less restrictive regulations on capital flows in order to encourage FDI flows.
On the other hand, Government size displays a negative and significant effect in the MENA region. The negative sign of Government size means positive relation with the level of government expenses, suggesting that public investment in infrastructures in these countries may have been important attractors for FDI flows. Previous work analysing the constraints for economic growth in the MENA countries (for example Brach, 2009 or Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2007) have also concluded that one important factor hampering economic development has been the deficiency in technological and physical infrastructures.
Finally, in the Fixed Effects model, unlike the EU, the effect of Trade Freedom in MENA countries is very small and it is not significant. All the other institutional aspects, Business Freedom, Property Rights and Freedom from corruption, do not seem to affect differently the EU and MENA regions.
Therefore, our results are in accordance with previous studies, which have concluded that the quality of institutions seem to be an important factor in explaining MENA FDI performance. In particular, the results suggest the existence of differences in the effect of investment climate, government size and trade barriers between the MENA and EU.
Conclusions
Historically the MENA region has been displaying low levels of FDI when compared with other emerging and developing regions, but the reasons for this situation are not yet clearly settled. This paper builds on previous research investigating the determinants of FDI in a sample of MENA and EU countries, considering some economic variables and others related to institutional factors. We analyse the overall significance of these variables and test for differences between the two regions.
One important conclusion of this work is that the pure economic variables (GDP and Openness) display positive and significant effects on FDI performance and present similar effects for both regions. However, in line with existing literature, we conclude that there are significant differences in institutional determinants, as these variables present different effects for the two regions, both with respect to the expected effect and significance. In particular, while some variables (Business Freedom, Property rights and Corruption Freedom) do not seem to be significant for both regions, others display very different effects, namely with respect to Investment Freedom, Government Size and to some extent to Trade Freedom.
In what concerns the MENA region, we find that Investment Freedom shows a positive and significant correlation to FDI performance, which means that policy measures taken by these countries in order to effectively reduce barriers to investment have boosted FDI. On the other hand, there is a significant and negative relation to government size, which, given the existent weaknesses in both physical and technological infrastructures in these countries, implies that public investment in providing infrastructures may have a central role in attracting FDI.
In the case of the EU, apparently some of the results do not seem to be in congruence with expectations. We believe that developments in the new member states during this period greatly contribute to this incongruence. In fact, during the transition period these countries have gone through relevant institutional and economic change, in preparation for the joining of the EU while at the same time attracting vast FDI flows.
Consequently, the disparity in the results of the institutional variables may be explained by two main facts. First, the two regions display very different economic and institutional contexts, along with high heterogeneity inside each group, which may influence in a different way the countries FDI attractiveness. Indeed, these two regions are at different stages of economic development which, according to the investment development path paradigm (Dunning, 1981) , might also explain the existence of different determinants of FDI flows.
Second, several ambiguities related to the theoretical and methodological reference frameworks persist. Some unexpected outcomes might result from a deficient specification of the variables contents as well as from the absence of a stable theoretical framework to explain the link between quality of institutions, economic freedom and the attractiveness of FDI. There is a need for new theoretical and empirical approaches that set the role of policy and institutions at the core of the economic analysis of FDI performance. economic environment or a set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom; a score of 0 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive to economic freedom. 
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